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Rohloff: Federal Courts - Civil Rights Action under Section 1983 - Collate

FEDERAL COURTS-CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION UNDER SECTION 1983COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOES NOT BAR FEDERAL LITIGATION UNDER
SECTION 1983 OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE CLAIMS FOLLOWING A STATE
COURT DECISION UPHOLDING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SEARCH
AND SEIZURE.

McCurry v. Allen (8th Cir. 1979)

Willie McCurry was arrested following a gun battle at his home and
charged with illegal possession of narcotics and assault with intent to kill.'
A state court conducted a suppression hearing to determine the admissibility of evidence seized in McCurry's home following his arrest, and determined that only the heroin which was found "in plain view" could be used at
trial. 2 McCurry was convicted in a state court on three counts, one of

which was based upon the heroin found in his home. 3
Following his conviction, McCurry filed a federal action under section

1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 18714 against two named police officers,
unknown police officers, and the St. Louis Police Department, 5 alleging,
inter alia, that the officers' seizure of the heroin in his house and the subsequent admission of this evidence at trial violated his rights under the
fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. 6
1. McCurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d 795, 796 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, S. Ct. (1980). Six or seven undercover police officers, acting upon an informant's tip that McCurry was
selling heroin, went to McCurry's house. 606 F.2d at 796. Two officers asked McCurry if they
could purchase some heroin while the other officers hid behind bushes. id. McCurry went into
his home and came back to the door firing a pistol. Id. The two officers at the door were
seriously wounded and a gun battle ensued. Id. Upon request by the police, McCurry and his
father came out of the house, whereupon they were seized by some officers while other officers
searched the house to be certain that no one else was inside. Id. During the course of this
search, heroin was discovered in some drawers, "among tires," and in "plain view." Id.
2. 606 F.2d at 796. The trial court did suppress the heroin which was found "among tires"
and in drawers. Id.
3. State v. McCurry, No. 77-862 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Jan. 6, 1978), affd, 587 S.W.2d 337 (Mo.
App. 1979). McCurry was convicted on one count of illegal possession of heroin and on two
counts of assault with intent to kill. 606 F.2d at 796.
4. McCurry v. Allen, 466 F. Supp. 514, 515, revd, 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
granted, S. Ct. (1980). See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of April
20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C § 1983 (1976).
5. 466 F. Supp. at 515. McCurry alleged that he had suffered $1,000,000 in damages. Id.
6. Id. The fourth amendment assures "[tIhe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. This protection is made applicable to the states by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, which provides that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend XIV, § 1. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 213 (1960); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
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Granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed McCurry's
claim with prejudice, concluding that McCurry was collaterally estopped 7 by
the state court's determination that the search and seizure was constitutional.8
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, reversed and remanded, holding that in suits instituted under section 1983, 9 collateral estoppel does not preclude federal review of search and seizure claims previously litigated in a state court.
McCurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, - S. Ct.

(1980).
Enacted pursuant to the enabling clause of the fourteenth amendment, 10 section 1983 creates a federal cause of action for deprivations of

The constitutional violations alleged by McCurry included: 1) a conspiracy by the police to
conduct an illegal search of his house; 2) an illegal search of his house; and 3) an assault by
police officers upon him during his arrest. 466 F. Supp. at 515.
7. 466 F. Supp. at 516. Collateral estoppel has been defined as the "doctrine which operates, following a final judgment, to establish conclusively a matter of fact or law for the purposes
of a later law suit on a different cause of action between the parties to the original action."
Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 IOWA L. REV. 217, 218 (1954)
(footnote omitted) (emphasis added). See also Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153
(1979); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979); Cromwell v. County of
Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No.
4, 1977). Also known as "issue preclusion," collateral estoppel is applicable only in the following
limited circumstances: 1) when the two suits involve an identical issue which was necessary to
the decision in the first case; and 2) when the estopped party had the opportunity and incentive
to fully litigate this issue in the first suit. Vestal, State Court Judgment as Preclusive in Section
1983 Litigation in a Federal Court, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 185, 193-94 (1974).
The purposes of collateral estoppel have been expressed as follows: 1) the achievement of
the conclusive resolution of disputes; 2) the conservation of judicial resources; 3) the protection
of adversaries from protracted litigation; 4) the minimization of inconsistent decisions; and 5) the
fostering of confidence in the judicial system. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. at 153-54;
Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897). Collateral estoppel should be
distinguished from res judicata, which is a general doctrine describing the binding effects of
former adjudications based on the same cause of action. See Developments in the Law-Res
Judicata, 65 HAftv. L. REv. 818, 820 n.1 (1952). See also Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. at
153; Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 47 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
On the subject of res judicata and collateral estoppel, see generally Hazard, Res Nova in
Res Judicata, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1036 (1971); Polasky, supra; Scott, Collateral Estoppel by
Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1942); Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Adjudicating
Bodies, 54 CEO. L. J. 857 (1966); Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Nature of the Controversy, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 158 (1965).
8. 466 F. Supp. at 515-16. The district court concluded that the only issue in the case was
"whether the entrance into plaintiff's home and the resulting search was lawful." Id. at 515. The
court noted that this question had been fully litigated on the merits in the state court proceeding, and therefore ruled that the prior determination by the state court estopped plaintiff from
raising the issue in this suit. Id. at 515-16. Cf. note 45 infra.
9. For a discussion of § 1983, see notes 10-22 and accompanying text infra.
10. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239-40 (1972); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
The enabling clause of the fourteenth amendment states: "The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Id.
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constitutional rights 1" under color of state law. 12 Since section 1983 establishes an "independent means of redress which a plaintiff could elect initially
in preference to an admittedly adequate state remedy," 13 this section has
14
resulted in significant oversight by the federal courts of state actions.
In Monroe v. Pape,15 a leading decision on section 1983, the Supreme
Court considered a section 1983 claim that police officers violated plaintiffs'
fourth and fourteenth amendment rights by breaking into plaintiffs' house
and ransacking it in search of evidence of a crime.1 6 Finding that a valid
cause of action existed under section 1983,17 the Court broadly stated that
plaintiffs' search and seizure claim required a hearing in a federal forum
since the full enjoyment of constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities
could best be effectuated in a federal court.' 8

11. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). For the text of § 1983, see note 4 supra. For a discussion of the
civil rights legislation, see generally Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction:A Reply, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 1352 (1970); Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L.
REv. 1323 (1952); Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1133 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Developments-§ 1983]; Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil
Rights Acts, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1953); Comment, Tort Liability of Law Enforcement
Officers Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 30 LA. L. REV. 100 (1969).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Concerning the operative phrase "under color of state law,"
the Supreme Court has stated: "Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken
under 'color of' state law." United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) (citations omitted).
See also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 108-13 (1945). This phrase was further construed
by the Court to encompass police action which is violative of constitutional rights, even if that
action lies outside the authority of state law. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961).
At least one commentator has noted that the requirement of a showing of unconstitutional
acts committed under color of state law creates "an inherent potential for bias" in the state
court. Averitt, Federal Section 1983 Actions After State Court Judgment, 44 U. COLO. L. REV.
191, 192 (1972), citing Chevigny, supra note 11, at 1358. The Supreme Court has expanded
upon this notion of potential state court bias and has recognized a right to a federal forum under
§ 1983. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373
U.S. 668, 672 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180, 183 (1961).
13. Averitt, supra note 12, at 192. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D.
SHAPIRO & H.

WECHSLER,

HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL

SYSTEM 952-53 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]. For the text of § 1983,

see note 4 supra.
14. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239, 242 (1972) (describing § 1983 as opening
"the federal courts to private citizens, offering a uniquely federal remedy against incursions
under the claimed authority of state law upon rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the
Nation"); Chevigny, supra note 11, at 1358 (recognizing that the Monroe line of cases signifies a
recognition "that the opportunity for state abuse of its remedial role is sufficiently high that an
alternative forum should be made available to guarantee federal civil rights").
15. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
16. Id. at 168-69.
17. Id. at 187. Although the Court found that plaintiffs stated a good cause of action against
the police officers, id., it dismissed plaintiffs' complaint against the City of Chicago, finding that
municipalities were not covered by § 1983. Id. at 192. It should be noted that Monroe's finding
that municipalities were not covered by § 1983 was overruled in Monell v. Department of
Social Servs,, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). For a discussion of Monell, see Note, Suing
Municipalities Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: The Impact of Monell v. Department of Social Services,
24 VILL. L. REV. 1008 (1979).
18. 365 U.S. at 180. The Monroe Court examined the legislative history of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 and concluded that one of the reasons it was passed
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The Court's preference for a federal forum for section 1983 claims was
expounded upon in Mitchum v. Foster,'9 where the Court established that
section 1983 authorizes federal courts to issue injunctive and declaratory relief against state court proceedings which infringe upon the petitioner's constitutional rights. 20 The Mitchum Court relied upon the legislative history
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which it found to be the source of the notion
that state courts may occasionally be antipathetic to the vindication of federally protected rights. 2 1 It was thus recognized by the Court that a federal
22
forum is better suited to safeguard these rights.
An alternate means of obtaining federal review of allegedly unconstitutional state action is through petitions of habeas corpus. 2 3 The writ of

was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion,
neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of
citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.
Id. Commentators have expressed criticism of this sweeping language in Monroe. See, e.g.,
Developments-§ 1983, supra note 11, at 1133 n.l; Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action
in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1486, 1487, 1501 (1969). For views defending Monroe's construction of the Civil Rights Act, see Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v.
Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. L. REV. 277, 321-22 (1965); Comment, The Civil
Rights Acts and Mr. Monroe, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 145, 160-62 (1961). See also note 64 and
accompanying text infra.
19. 407 U.S. 225 (1972). Mitchumn involved a proceeding by the State of Florida to close
down plaintiff's bookstore as a public nuisance. Id. at 227. The Florida trial court issued a
preliminary order prohibiting the continued operation of the store pending the outcome of the
suit. Id. Plaintiff then filed an action under § 1983 in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Florida, alleging deprivation of his first and fourteenth amendment rights
and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the pending state court proceeding. Id.
20. Id. at 242. In holding that the federal district court could enjoin further proceedings in
the Florida courts, the Mitchum Court declared that § 1983 was intended to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment concerning state action, "whether that action be executive,
legislative, or judicial." Id., quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879).
21. 407 U.S. at 242. The Court noted that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 "makes evident that
Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the relationship between the States and the
Nation with respect to the protection of federally created rights." Id. For portions of the legislative history of the 1871 Civil Rights Act which support this statement, see CONC. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 361 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Swann); id. at 385 (remarks of Rep. Lewis); id. at
416 (remarks of Rep. Biggs); id. at 429 (remarks of Rep. McHenry); id. app., at 179 (remarks of
Rep. Voorhees); id. app., at 216 (remarks of Sen. Thurman).
22. 407 U.S. at 242. See also Averitt, supra note 12, at 192; Chevigny, supra note 11, at
1357-59; McCormack, Federalism & Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of ConstitutionalClaims, Part III, 60 VA. L. REV. 250, 264 (1974). But see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 493-94 & n.35 (1976); notes 30-34 and accompanying text infra.
23. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 416 (1963). The early English use of habeas corpus was
in the form of orders issued after the initiation of judicial proceedings to assure the appearance
of the parties in court. See Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L.
REV. 1038, 1042 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Developments-Habeas Corpus]. The English writ
was later broadened, empowering the courts to release prisoners from arbitrary arrests and to
review the grounds of confinement. Id. at 1045.
The first habeas corpus statute in the United States was the Judiciary Act Sf 1789, which
provided for the issuance of writs by the federal courts to prisoners "in custody under (r by
colour of the authority of the United States." Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73,
81-82. See Developments-Habeas Corpus, supra, at 1044. In 1867, this federal habeas corpus
relief was extended to state prisoners. See Judiciary Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat.
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habeas corpus provides a "ready mechanism for a constitutional attack" on
and is available to test
arbitrary exercises of state power to detain individuals
24
the legal bases of the "conditions of confinement."
Concerning the scope of federal habeas corpus relief, early cases consid-

ered the writ to be "of the most comprehensive character. It brings within
the habeas corpus jurisdiction of every court and of every judge every possible case of privation of liberty contrary to the National Constitution, treaties,
or laws."

25

This expansive concept of habeas corpus was more recently rec-

ognized by the Supreme Court in Fay v. Noia, 26 where the Court stated
that federal courts have the power to grant a writ of habeas corpus to provide an effective remedy for constitutional violations. 2 7 The Fay Court
found, however, that "[d]iscretion is implicit in the statutory command" for
the federal judge to "deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately bypassed the orderly procedure of the state courts." 28 Thus, while Fay
adhered to the notion of a broad federal power to review state court judgments, it recognized a limited discretion to withhold a federal habeas
forum .29

385-86. The present federal habeas corpus statute directs the federal courts to entertain a
habeas writ "in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on
the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)(1976). The other relevant federal habeas provision states that the
writ is to extend to a prisoner who "is in custody under or by authority of the United States ...
or . . .is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." Id.
§ 224 1(c).
24. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 1428-29 (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court
has recognized that federal habeas corpus review is available for claims alleging "disregard of
the constitutional rights of the accused, where the writ is the only effective means of preserving
his rights." Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942). A state prisoner's challenge to a
trial court's resolution of federal issues was also stated to be an appropriate basis upon which to
invoke federal habeas jurisdiction. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 463-64 (1953). This broad
habeas corpus jurisdiction was restricted, however, in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). For
a discussion of Stone, see notes 30-34 and accompanying text infra..
For a general discussion of the role of habeas corpus, see Bator, Finality in Crininal Law
and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963); Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REV. 423
(1961); Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73
HARV. L. REv. 84 (1959); Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH.
L. REV. 451 (1966); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74
HARv. L. REV. 1315 (1961).
25. Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325-26 (1867). See also Ex Parte Siebold, 100
U.S. 371, 376-77 (1879).
26. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). In Fay, the defendant had been convicted in a state court for
felony murder on the sole basis of a signed confession. Id. at 394-95. Habeas corpus relief was
requested by the defendant on the ground that his confession was coerced and, thus, was violative of his fiurteenth amendment right to due process. Id. at 395. The major issue in Fay, as
determined by the Court, was whether the defendant had waived his right to federal habeas
review by failing to appeal his conviction in a state court. Id. at 394.
27. Id. at 434, 441. See Developments-Habeas Corpus, supra note 23, at 1060-62 (habeas
corpus should ensure federal forum to provide full protection of constitutional rights).
28. 372 U.S. at 438.
29. Id.This discretionary element in federal habeas corpus jurisdiction had previously been
articulated by the Court when it held that the use of habeas corpus to obtain federal review of

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1980

5

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 8

VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

25: p. 403

The first major limitation on the availability of federal habeas corpus was
3
imposed by the Supreme Court in Stone v. Powell, " where it was held that
federal habeas review of alleged fourth amendment search and seizure violations should not be granted when these claims have been "fully and fairly
litigated in the state court."-3 1 In finding that deference should be given to
state court search and seizure determinations which are neither incomplete
nor unfair, 32 the Stone Court expressed a view markedly dissimilar to its

constitutional claims will not necessarily be granted if the court is "'satisfied that federal constitutional rights have been protected." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 464 (1953) (footnote
omitted). The Brown Court also noted that since the state and federal courts have the same
responsibility to protect an individual's constitutional rights, the federal court may decline to
award a writ of habeas corpus where the highest state court has adjudged that the prisoner's
detention was lawful, whether through affirmance on appeal or through denial of post-conviction
remedies. Id. at 465. See also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963) (indicating the
circumstances under which a federal court is compelled to grant a writ of habeas corpus);
Thornton v. United States, 368 F.2d 822, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (noting that there is no imperative command to grant collateral review when state procedures are directly available); note 66
infra.
30. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). In Stone, the respondent's murder conviction was based in part on
the seizure of a revolver subsequent to his arrest for violating a vagrancy statute. Id. at 468-69.
Respondent's motion to the state court to supress the evidence on the basis of an alleged unconstitutional search and seizure was denied, and the California Court of Appeals subsequently
affirmed the conviction. Id. at 470.
The state of the law immediately prior to Stone was expressed in Kaufman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969), which held that the fourth amendment, as applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment, requires the grant of federal habeas corpus when the prisoner's conviction was based upon evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure. 394 U.S. at
225. The Stone Court asserted that the Court in Kaufman believed this result to be compelled
by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653 (1961), which required the exclusion of such evidence at
trial and a reversal of the conviction on direct review. 428 U.S. at 480-81. See also Desisto v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 224 (1968).
31. 428 U.S. at 494. Although acknowledging the broad power conferred to it by the habeas
corpus statute the Stone Court stated that it still possessed discretion over the exercise of that
power. Id. at 478 n.ll. Reviewing the cases supporting the view that habeas corpus relief
should be available in search and seizure cases, the Stone Court found that only one case
actually granted habeas corpus relief on the basis of fourth amendment claims. Id. at 481, citing
Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971). The Court nevertheless distinguished Whiteley on
the grounds that the Whiteley Court was not asked to consider the applicability of the writ to
such claims. 428 U.S. at 481.
The majority in Stone advanced several reasons for the exclusion of search and seizure
claims from habeas corpus review: 1) the justification for the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule is the deterrence of future unlawful police conduct and the state courts are in a better
position to deter state officials, id. at 484; 2) the costs of permitting habeas corpus review of
state court applications of the exclusionary rule far outweigh the benefits of such review, id. at
491-93; 3) since typical fourth amendment claims have no bearing on the "basic justification of
the defendant's incarceration," the need for federal review is minimized, id. at 491-92 n.31; and
4) state courts are as competent as federal courts to deal with fourth amendment claims. id. at
493-94 n.35.
For a further discussion of the Stone analysis, see notes 55-59 & 62 and accompanying text
infra.
32. 428 U.S. at 494.
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position in Monroe 33 and Mitchum, 34 both of which favored federal review
of state court decisions.
When federal courts review a state court determination through either
habeas corpus or section 1983, the issue arises whether a state court's judgment concerning the alleged constitutional violation estops 35 federal relitigation of that issue. Considering this question in the habeas corpus context,
the Court in Brown v. Allen 36 established the general rule that collateral
estoppel does not bar a federal court, entertaining a habeas corpus plea,
from relitigating constitutional issues previously decided in state courts.

37

In contrast to the habeas corpus area, the issue of the applicability of

collateral estoppel in the section 1983 context has not been conclusively decided by the Supreme Court. The Court, in Preiser v. Rodriguez,3 8 indi-

cated in dictum that it did consider the general doctrine of res judicata to be
"fully applicable to a civil rights action brought under § 1983."
The
specific question of whether collateral estoppel is an appropriate bar in section 1983 suits, however, does not appear to have been directly addressed
by the Supreme Court.
The majority of federal district and circuit courts which have considered

the issue 40 have found that collateral estoppel properly precludes federal

33. See 365 U.S. at 180; notes 15-18 and accompanying text supra.
34. See 407 U.S. at 240-42; notes 19-22 and accompanying text supra.
35. For a definition and discussion of collateral estoppel, see note 7 supra.
36. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). In Brown, state prisoners attacked the composition of the grand
jury by a writ of habeas corpus, and questioned the voluntary character of a confession used at
trial. Id. at 452. The district court refused to accept habeas jurisdiction. Id.
37. Id. at 458. The Court in Brown noted that "where the state action was based on an
adequate state ground, no further examination is required, unless no state remedy for the deprivation of federal constitutional rights ever existed." Id. (citation omitted). The Court further
observed that "where there is material conflict of fact in the transcripts of evidence as to deprivation of constitutional rights, the District Court may properly depend upon the state's resolution of the issue." Id. (citation omitted).
38. 411 U.S. 475 (1973). In Preiser, federal review was concurrently requested through
habeas corpus and section 1983 to decide the constitutionality of the practice of depriving state
prisoners of good-conduct-time credits after disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 476-77. The Court
determined that the appropriate remedy in this case was habeas corpus. Id. at 490.
39. Id. at 497, citing Coogan v. Cincinnati Bar Ass'n, 431 F.2d 1209, 1211 (6th Cir. 1970);
Jenson v. Olson, 353 F.2d 825, 829 (8th Cir. 1965); Rhodes v. Meyer, 334 F.2d 709, 716 (8th
Cir. 1964); Goss v. Illinois, 312 F.2d 257, 259 (7th Cir. 1963). See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 554 n.12 (1974) (adhering in dictum to the Preiser observation that the normal principles of res judicata apply in § 1983 suits).
40. For circuit court decisions applying collateral estoppel in the context of a § 1983 suit,
see Robbins v. District Ct., 592 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1979); Fernandez v. Trias Monge, 586 F.2d
848 (1st Cir. 1978); Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1978); Wiggins v. Murphy, 576
F.2d 572 (4th Cir. 1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 874 (1979); Martin v. Delcambre,
578 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Goodrich v. Supreme Ct., 511 F.2d 316 (8th Cir.
1975); Metros v. United States Dist. Ct., 441 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1971); Kauffman v. Moss, 420
F.2d 1270 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 846 (1970); Coogan v. Cincinnati Bar Ass'n, 431
F.2d 1209 (6th Cir. 1970); Mulligan v. Schlachter, 389 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1968) (per curiam);
Jenson v. Olson, 353 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1965). But see Brubaker v. King, 505 F.2d 534, 537-38
(7th Cir. 1974); Ney v. California, 439 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1971).
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relitigation through section 1983 of issues already determined in a state
court. 41 Among the lower court decisions, however, only two cases in42
volved section 1983 claims based upon search and seizure violations.
Since these two fourth amendment cases were decided before federal
habeas corpus review of such claims was severely restricted in Stone, 4 3 they
did not fully consider the effect of collaterally estopping a claimant's last
possible means of obtaining federal review.4 4 The issue thus becomes
whether, given the restriction imposed by Stone on federal forum availability
for fourth amendment claims, collateral estoppel should constitute a complete bar to relitigation of these claims in suits instituted under section 1983.
It was against this background that the Eighth Circuit reviewed the
district court's holding 45 that, in section 1983 actions, collateral estoppel
precludes federal relitigation of the state court judgment. 46 The McCurry
court first noted that most of the courts which had confronted the general
question of whether collateral estoppel could bar any section 1983 claims on
the basis of a fully litigated state criminal trial had decided that collateral
estoppel did so apply. 47 While acknowledging that this general issue was
For district court decisions applying collateral estoppel in § 1983 proceedings, see Olitt v.
Murphy, 453 F. Supp. 354 (S.D.N.Y.), affd mere., 591 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1978); Hammer v.
Town of Greenburgh, 440 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd ioem., 578 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir.
1978); Smith v. Sinclair, 424 F. Supp. 1108 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Rodriguez v. Beame, 423 F.
Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Stpp. 86 (E.D. Va. 1973).
41. See cases cited note 40 supra.
42. See Metros v. United States Dist. Ct., 441 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1971); Mulligan v.
Schlachter, 389 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1968) (per curiam).
43. 428 U.S. at 482. See notes 30-34 and accompanying text supra. Many of the non-fourth
amendment cases which were decided before Stone and which applied collateral estoppel relied
heavily on the availability of the alternative federal forum of habeas corpus. See, e.g.,
Thistlewaite v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339, 343 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093
(1974); Alexander v. Emerson, 489 F.2d 285, 286 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Palma v. Powers,
295 F. Supp. 924, 937 (N.D. I11. 1969).
44. But see notes 62-63 and accompanying text infra.
45. 606 F.2d at 797. Since McCnrry also claimed that he had been assaulted by police
officers upon arrest and that the officers had conspired to conduct an illegal search, the Eighth
Circuit found that the trial court erred in stating that the only issue in the case was the
search and seizure claim. Id. See note 8 supra. The assault and conspiracy issues were remanded to the district court for full consideration. 606 F.2d at 797.
46. 606 F.2d at 797. See 466 F. Supp. at 516; note 7 and accompanying text supra.
47. 606 F.2d at 797-98, citing Fernandez v. Trias Monge, 586 F.2d 848, 854 (1st Cir. 1978);
Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 58 (2d Cir. 1978); Wiggins v. Murphy, 576 F.2d 572, 573 (4th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 874 (1979); Martin v. Delcambre, 578 F.2d 1164, 1165 (5th
Cir. 1978); Turco v. Monroe County Bar Ass'n, 554 F.2d 515, 520-21 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 834 (1977); Rimmer v. Fayetteville Police Dept., 576 F.2d 273, 276 (4th Cir. 1977);
Meadows v. Evans, 529 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir.), affd en banc, 550 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); Mastracchio v. Ricci, 498 F.2d 1257, 1260 (1st Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975); Thistlewaite v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339, 341-43 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974); Moye v. City of Raleigh, 503 F.2d 631, 634 (4th Cir.
1974); Brazzell v. Adams, 493 F.2d 489, 490 (5th Cir. 1974); Metros v. United States Dist. Ct.,
441 F.2d 313, 316 (10th Cir. 1971); Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1274 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 846 (1970); Mulligan v. Schlachter, 389 F.2d 231, 233 (6th Cir. 1968); Olitt v.
Murphy, 453 F. Supp. 354, 358-60 (S.D.N.Y.), affd mere., 591 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1978);
Hammer v. Town of Greenburgh, 440 F. Supp. 27, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd moem., 578 F.2d
1368 (2d Cir. 1978); Smith v. Sinclair, 424 F. Supp. 1108, 1111-12 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Rod-
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one of first impression in the Eighth Circuit, the McCurry court nonetheless
declined to conclusively decide it.4 8 Rather, the court's analysis focused on
the more specific question of whether Stone's limitation of habeas corpus
relief for fourth amendment claims of unconstitutional search and seizure
compelled a relaxation of the preclusion doctrine in a section 1983 suit. 4 9
The court held that since the federal courts were intended to play a
special and vital role in protecting civil rights,5 0 and since there was no
longer an alternative federal forum available through habeas corpus, 5 1 collateral estoppel should not preclude a section 1983 suit based on claims of an
unconstitutional search and seizure. 52 The McCurry court nevertheless conriguez v. Beame, 423 F. Supp. 906, 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86,
88-89 (E.D. Va. 1973).
48. 606 F.2d at 798. The McCurry court noted that the Eighth Circuit had previously
applied collateral estoppel in three civil rights actions. Id. at 798 n.10, citing Robbins v. District
Ct., 592 F.2d 1015, 1016 (8th Cir. 1979) (collaterally estopping relitigation of a claim where the
underlying state proceedings were civil); Goodrich v. Supreme Ct., 511 F.2d 316, 318 (8th Cir.
1975) (barring relitigation of a state civil action which considered the constitutionality of disbarment proceedings); Jenson v. Olson, 353 F.2d 825, 829 (8th Cir. 1965) (applying collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of a purely factual matter in a suit alleging unconstitutional dismissal from
civil service employment).
49. 606 F.2d at 798. The court stated:
The specific issue is whether appellant's § 1983 claim raising search and seizure questions
is barred by collateral estoppel; the unusual circumstance is that since 1976, search and
seizure claims, except in a few situations, can no longer be raised by state prisoners in
federal habeas corpus actions. Thus, if collateral estoppel is to apply in § 1983 actions
raising search and seizure claims, there will be no federal forum for the victim of a search
and seizure which allegedly violates the federal constitution.
Id. For a discussion of Stone, see notes 30-34 and accompanying text supra; notes 56-59, 62 &
66 and accompanying text infra.
50. 606 F.2d at 799, citing Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (federal courts are
"guardians" of constitutional rights). See note 64 and accompanying text infra. But see notes
65-66 and accompanying text infra.
The McCurry court relied upon Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in Stone which
justified denying a federal habeas corpus forum for fourth amendment claims because there
were alternative federal forums available. 428 U.S. at 500-01 (Burger, C. J., concurring). 606
F.2d at 799. The inference was made in McCurry that a § 1983 civil rights action constituted
one of these alternative federal forums. Id.
51. 606 F.2d at 799. Although the McCurry court mentioned that "a few situations" do exist
where search and seizure claims can be raised by state prisoners in a federal habeas corpus suit,
see id. at 798, the court did not specify what it perceived these exceptions to be, nor did it
consider any of them to be applicable to a case such as the one at bar. Id. Rather, the court
broadly stated that "if collateral estoppel is to apply in § 1983 actions raising search and seizure
claims, there will be no federal forum for the victim of a search and seizure which allegedly
violates the federal constitution." Id. See note 49 supra; cf. note 62-63 and accompanying text
infra.
52. Id. The McCurry court relied upon the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ney v. California,
439 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1971). 606 F.2d at 798 n.10. In Ney, appellant filed a § 1983 action,
subsequent to a state court criminal conviction and a denial of habeas corpus, alleging police
misconduct in questioning him without advising him of his rights, in disregarding his requests
for counsel, and in altering electronic tapes of the interrogation. 439 F.2d at 1286-87. The Ninth
Circuit refused to collaterally estop the § 1983 claim, finding that to do so would render § 1983
a "dead letter." Id. at 1288. The Ney court concluded in dictum that since the Civil Rights Act
antedated the exclusionary rule, the latter should not be construed to limit the remedies
created by Congress for the vindication of civil rights. Id. See also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 509 n.14 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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cluded that, on remand, the district court should withhold decision on
McCurry's fourth amendment claim pending the state appellate court's review of that claim. 5 3
It is submitted that the McCurry court, in permitting federal review of
search and seizure claims already decided by state courts, 54 chose to overlook the Stone Court's cost-benefit analysis regarding federal relitigation of
such claims. 55 The Stone Court clearly considered the benefits to be gained
from allowing relitigation of fourth amendment claims-such as the nurturing of respect for constitutional values 56 -to be outweighed by the societal
costs of permitting relitigation-such as depletion of judicial resources and
contempt for the criminal justice system. 57 It was further noted by the
Supreme Court that collaterally estopping the less grievous fourth amendment claims, and thus limiting federal review of state court decisions, 58
would minimize friction between federal and state court systems and would
achieve the desirable goal of finality in criminal trials. 59 The Stone Court's
analysis, it is suggested, is equally applicable to the case at bar and should
have been utilized by the McCurry court to conclude that collateral estoppel
bars federal relitigation of fourth amendment claims in suits brought under
section 1983.60
An important distinguishing factor in the Ney case is that the issue of unconstitutional
interrogation was found not to have been litigated in the state court. 439 F.2d at 1288. This is
significant in light of the established principle that collateral estoppel is never an effective bar
when the relevant issue was not raised in the state proceeding. See note 7 supra. In McCurry,
on the other hand, the fourth amendment issue had been fully litigated in the state court
proceeding. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
53. 606 F.2d at 799. The effect of this temporary abstention was to show deference to the
Missouri courts while preventing the statute of limitations from denying appellant his § 1983
action. Id. For a discussion of the abstention doctrine which permits state courts to litigate cases
free from federal interference, see Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 333-36 (1977); Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604-07 (1975); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971); Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 162 (1908).
54. 606 F.2d at 799. See notes 50-52 and accompanying text supra.
55. See notes 56-59 and accompanying text infra.
56. 428 U.S. at 491. Cf. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 228-29 (1969) (indicating
that collateral review is necessary to preserve the vitality of all constitutional rights).
57. 428 U.S. at 491. The Stone Court noted that although the exclusionary rule nurtured
"respect for Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately it may well have the opposite effect of generating disrespect for the law and administration of justice." Id. See also
Thornton v. United States, 368 F.2d 822, 826-27 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (collateral federal review
cannot deal with search and seizure claims as effectively as direct state review).
58. 428 U.S. at 491.
59. Id. at 491 n.31, quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973) (Powell,
j., concurring). The Stone Court stated that collateral federal review of search and seizure
claims under writs of habeas corpus should generally be avoided for the following reasons: 1) to
realize "the most effective utilization of limited judicial resources"; 2) to attain "finality in criminal trials"; 3) to minimize "friction between our federal and state systems of justice"; and 4) to
maintain "the constitutional balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded." 428
U.S. at 491 n.31. See also Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 539 (1976) (comity and concerns
for the orderly administration of justice require federal courts to forego habeas review in some
circumstances); Vestal. supra note 7, at 202. Cf. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 228
(1969) (finality is an inappropriate goal in this context).
60. It is suggested that the following justifications provided by the Stone Court for limiting
federal habeas corpus review are applicable to all instances where a federal forum is sought for
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Not only is it contended that the McCurry court failed to follow the
articulated purposes of Stone's limitation on the availability of collateral federal review of search and seizure claims, but it is also submitted that the
McCurry court's concern that federal review would not exist absent section
1983 reflects a misinterpretation of Stone.6 1 This is evident from the fact
that the Supreme Court in Stone did not deny federal courts of all jurisdiction over habeas corpus claims, but rather sought to limit that jurisdiction to
the most grievous cases where there is a showing of both a fourth amend62
It
ment violation and a denial in the state court of full and fair litigation.
is thus suggested that the holding in McCurry is undermined to the extent
that it relies heavily upon the unfounded assumption that Stone blocked all
habeas corpus relief "for the victim of a search and seizure which allegedly
63
violates the federal constitution."
The analysis of the McCurry court, it is also contended, reflects a belief
64
that the state court system cannot adequately protect constitutional rights.
65
While the court found support for this view in Mitchum, it is suggested
reviewing state court determinations of search and seizure claims: 1) the purpose of the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule is to deter future unlawful police action and the state courts are in
a better position to deter state officials, 428 U.S. at 484; 2) the typical fourth amendment claims
have no bearing on the "basic justification of the defendant's incarceration," and therefore the
need for federal review is minimized, id. at 491-92 n.31; and 3) state courts are as competent as
federal courts to deal with fourth amendment claims, id. at 493-94 n.35.
In addition, the Stone Court maintained that the costs of allowing federal habeas corpus
review of state court applications of the exclusionary rule far outweigh the benefits of such review. 428 U.S. at 491-93. The Court recognized that "[t]hese long-recognized costs of the rule
persist when a criminal conviction is sought to be overturned on collateral review on the ground
that a search-and-seizure claim was erroneously rejected by two or more tiers of state courts."
Id. at 491 (footnote omitted). It is contended that this same reasoning applies to preclude collateral federal review of McCurry's § 1983 fourth amendment claim. This is especially evident in
that the Stone Court appears to have been more concerned with the undesirable costs associated with collateral review of search and seizure claims than with the particular form of
federal jurisdiction invoked. Id. at 491-93. See note 31 supra.
61. 606 F.2d at 799. See notes 30-31 & 56-59 and accompanying text supra.
62. 428 U.S. at 494-95 n.37.
63. 606 F.2d at 798-99. Habeas corpus review would therefore be available to McCurry if
he could show that he had not been afforded a full and fair litigation in the state court. See 428
U.S. at 494-95 n.37. The McCurry court did not specifically acknowledge this possibility. See
606 F.2d at 799. Rather, the court appears to have based its decision on the total unavailability
of federal habeas corpus review for the victim of an allegedly unconstitutional search and seizure. See id. at 798-99; note 51 supra.
64. See 606 F.2d at 799. For views indicating that a federal forum is necessary to fully
adjudicate constitutional claims, see Averitt, supra note 12, at 218 (federal courts necessary for
"protection of those rights which are within their special province"); Chevigny, supra note 11,
at 1357-60 (preferring federal courts for review of constitutional claims since they deal with the
issues on a more uniform, more frequent, and less insulated basis); Theis, Res Judicata in Civil
Rights Act Cases: An Introduction to the Problem, 70 Nw. L. REv. 859, 881-82 (1976) (contending that the Civil Rights Act "counsels against an expansive reading of res judicata");
Developments-Habeas Corpus, supra note 23, at 1060-62, 1273 (noting that a federal forum is
needed to test the constitutional basis of the conviction since the state courts are primarily
concerned with deciding guilt or innocence); notes 15-22 and accompanying text supra. But see
note 66 infra.
65. 606 F.2d at 799. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. at 242; notes 19-22 and accompanying text supra. In contrast to the Civil Rights cases cited by the McCurry court, which consid-
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that the Supreme Court's more recent decision in Stone indicates, at least in
the fourth amendment context, an abandonment of the notion that state
courts are inadequate guardians of federal rights. 66 Thus, an inconsistency
is evident between the section 1983 cases which purport to provide a right
to a federal forum for constitutional claims, 67 and the more recent habeas
corpus case of Stone v. Powell which restricted the availability of this
forum. 68 Therefore, at present, the lower federal courts have broad discre-

tion in either denying or granting federal collateral review in section 1983
cases because there appears to be justification for either choice. Since certiorari has been granted on the McCurry case, 69 it is hoped that this inconsistency will be resolved by an affirmance of the principles announced in
Stone.
In considering the impact of McCurry, it is evident that the Eighth
Circuit will allow federal collateral review of search and seizure claims in
section 1983 cases without regard to the fullness or fairness of the state court
litigation. 70 It is submitted that this decision, unless reversed by the Supreme Court, will lead the way for an undesirable erosion of the limiting
devices which the Stone Court attempted to impose on the availability of a
71
federal forum for claims of fourth amendment violations.
It is suggested that although the intention of the Civil Rights Act of
1871 appears to have been to provide exclusive federal constitutional remedies, 72 such a requirement is no longer necessary. 73 A federal forum

ered the federal courts to be the ultimate "guardians of people's federal rights," stand the
recent cases which have collaterally estopped federal relitigation of state court determinations of
constitutional issues. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Dieffenbach v. Attorney Gen. of Vt., 604 F.2d 187 (2d Cir.
1979); Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1978); Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co.,
553 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1977). See also notes 39-41 & 47-48 and accompanying text supra.
66. See 428 U.S. at 493-94 n.35; notes 31-34 and accompanying text supra. The Stone Court
stated that the contention that federal judges are better suited to apply federal constitutional
law "is especially unpersuasive in the context of search and seizure claims, since they are dealt
with on a daily basis by trial level judges in both systems." 428 U.S. at 494 n.35. The Court was
"unwilling to assume" that state courts lack "appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights." Id.
For views in favor of applying collateral estoppel to federal review of state court litigation of
constitutional claims, see Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923); Vestal, supra
note 7, at 210-12; Note, supra note 18, at 1501.
67. See notes 15-22 and accompanying text supra.
68. See notes 30-34 & 56-59 and accompanying text supra.
69. S. Ct. (1980).
70. See 606 F.2d at 799; notes 47-52 and accompanying text supra.
71. 428 U.S. at 491, 491 n.31. See notes 30-34 & 56-59 and accompanying text supra.
72. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. at 241-42; Rimmer v. Fayetteville Police Dept., 567
F.2d 273, 276 (4th Cir. 1977); Averitt, supra note 12, at 192, 217.
73. See Coogan v. Cincinnati Bar Ass'n, 431 F.2d 1209, 1211 (6th Cir. 1970)(Civil Rights Act
not designed to provide a means for federal collateral attack of issues decided in state court);
Developments-§ 1983, supra note 11; Note, supra note 18. But see Rimmer v. Fayetteville
Police Dept., 567 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1977). The Riouner court noted in dictum that application
of the Stone holding may have the undesirable effect of completely denying a state court prisoner access to a federal forum. Id. at 276. In these cases, the court continued, the Civil Rights
Act itself probably bars collaterally estopping the issue in federal court. Id. For further discussion of both viewpoints, see note 18 supra.
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should be available for collateral review of state decisions, it is contended, in
only the most grievous cases and only for the most lawless deprivations of
constitutional rights. 74 It is suggested that this result would be consistent
with the Stone analysis, which most realistically deals with judicial practicalities and federal-state comity concerns. 75 In contraposition to McCurry's refusal to apply collateral estoppel in section 1983 actions based on
fourth amendment claims, it is concluded that, absent a showing of trial
unfairness or incompleteness, collateral estoppel should be applied and state
court litigation should be acknowledged as an adequate protection of constitutional rights.
Linda M. Rohloff
74. See notes 30-34 & 62 and accompanying text supra. The Stone Court indicated that the
federal habeas corpus forum should still be available to ensure "that no innocent person suffers
an unconstitutional loss of liberty." 428 U.S. at 491. See also Note, The Preclusive Effect of
State Judgments on Subsequent 1983 Actions, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 610, 614-18 (1978) (suggesting a collateral review of state court's procedural fairness approach).
75. See notes 56-59 and accompanying text supra.
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